Africa has seen similar trade preference schemes before, most notably AGOA (the African Growth and Opportunity Act) and the European Union’s Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative.
AGOA produced concentrated winners, with a handful of countries building apparel, textile, and automotive
export bases through US duty-free access. But the gains were fragile for instance when trade access was suspended or threatened, these industries contracted quickly.
EBA delivered limited results in Africa. While it boosted apparel growth in other developing regions, most African economies failed to scale due to weak processing capacity, logistics, and compliance barriers, including rules of origin and SPS standards. China’s 2010 LDC programme showed the same pattern: modest gains in agricultural exports, but no industrial transformation, as constraints were domestic rather than external.
Across all three cases, the pattern is consistent: unilateral trade access benefits economies with existing capacity,
gains concentrate in a few fast movers, and reversals are costly because investment adjusts slowly.